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Foreword
In June, 1977, Michael N. Chetkovich, then chairman of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, acting at the direction of the 
board of directors of the Institute, appointed a five-man group to 
study the recommendations of the Commission on Auditors’ Respon­
sibilities pertaining to the structure of the AICPA Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee and to make recommendations. This Report 
is the product of that assignment.
During the course of our study, we received assistance from 
numerous individuals who were interested in strengthening and 
improving the structure of the auditing standards-setting body. We 
wish to acknowledge with appreciation that assistance, including 
particularly Thomas R. Hanley, our administrative secretary, and 
Professor David Solomons who assisted in drafting the Report.
Ivan O. Bull
Philip L. Defliese
Samuel A. Derieux
Louis M. Kessler
Walter J. Oliphant, Chairman
May, 1978
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Origin and Scope of the 
Committee’s Study
The AICPA Special Committee to Study the Structure of the Audit­
ing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) was established in 
June, 1977, as an indirect result of the Report of Tentative Con­
clusions of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Cohen 
commission).1 The direct response by the AICPA to the commis­
sion’s tentative conclusions, which were made public in April, 1977, 
was the creation of an AICPA Special Committee Regarding the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Derieux committee). 
That committee reported that it was not convinced of the soundness 
of the Cohen commission’s principal recommendation relating to 
the setting of auditing standards, namely that the present volunteer 
Institute committee charged with that responsibility, AudSEC, should 
be replaced by a full-time paid board. The Derieux committee tenta­
tively concluded that a number of more modest interrelated changes 
in AudSEC’s organization and operation might be considered:
1. Both references to the Cohen commission are to the commission’s Final 
Report, released in January, 1978.
1. Reduce AudSEC membership to fifteen.
2. Rotate representation of the eight largest firms.
3. Change voting to a simple majority.
4. Open meetings to the public.
5. Establish a new committee to set standards for accounting and 
review service engagements.
6. Establish a mechanism to assure that AudSEC gives greater 
consideration to the needs of nonpublic companies in estab­
lishing auditing standards.
7. Provide increased staff capability to help expedite the work 
of AudSEC.
The committee further recommended that another special com­
mittee be appointed to study the restructuring of AudSEC, and it 
was in response to that recommendation that the present committee 
was established.
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It should be noted that our charge was limited to the examina­
tion of the structure within the AICPA for developing auditing stand­
ards to determine what changes, if any, are necessary to improve 
that process. We were not asked to undertake a critical evaluation 
of AudSEC’s published statements nor to become involved with 
technical questions of auditing theory or practice. The scope 
of our study has been restricted accordingly.
Conduct of the Study
Since the committee’s meeting on August 30, 1977, it has met on 
seven separate occasions for a total of nine days. Two additional 
days were devoted to a public hearing held in New York on Feb­
ruary 2 and 3, 1978.
The committee began its study by reviewing internal statistical 
data that traced the subjects placed on the agenda of AudSEC 
during the past fifteen years from inception to disposition. Particu­
lar attention was paid to the nature of the subjects and the time 
required to dispose of them during the last five years.
During the second phase of the study, we conducted thirty-two 
informal interviews designed to elicit the opinions of users of fin­
ancial information and of others who are knowledgeable about or 
interested in the auditing standards-setting process. Individuals 
interviewed were associated with
• Government
• Professional organizations
• National securities markets
• The legal profession
• Public accounting firms
In addition, the committee interviewed representatives of both the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities and AudSEC as well as 
their staff directors.
The third and final phase of the study was the conduct of a 
formal public hearing, which was announced throughout the pro­
fession and among governmental agencies, professional organiza­
tions, the academic community, securities regulators, and other 
interested parties. A copy of the announcement was mailed to each 
of the AICPA’s 135,000 members. The public hearing resulted in 
oral and/or written submissions by forty-three individuals and or­
ganizations.
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The information and opinions received by the committee in the 
course of its study were carefully considered. The committee’s 
conclusions were not disclosed to anyone outside its staff prior to 
their presentation to the Board of Directors of the Institute in the 
form of a preliminary report. The conclusions reached in that re­
port were subsequently published in the CPA Letter of March 27, 
1978, and in the April, 1978, issue of the Journal of Accountancy.
The committee has decided that the proceedings of the public 
hearing and related submissions should constitute a public record. 
Accordingly, the documents are available for public inspection at 
the offices of the AICPA, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, 
N. Y. 10036, and comprise the following materials:
1. A full transcript of the oral proceedings at the committee’s 
public hearing on February 2 and 3, 1978.
2. Copies of all written submissions to the committee in response 
to the notice of public hearing.
Copies of any of the foregoing are available for examination on 
request, and copies may be purchased from the AICPA.
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The Development of 
Auditing Standards
The development of the profession’s efforts to formulate auditing 
standards can be traced back at least to 1917, when the American 
Institute of Accountants (as the AICPA was then called) prepared 
a memorandum on “balance sheet audits” for the Federal Trade 
Commission. This memorandum, published in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin of April, 1917, under the title Approved Methods for the 
Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements, was reissued, revised 
and expanded, with significant changes in title and terminology, 
in the ensuing years. But, it was the McKesson & Robbins case 
(1938) creating as it did a “crisis in auditing,” to use John L. Carey’s 
phrase, that demonstrated that auditors needed much more guid­
ance to enable them to meet their responsibilities to stockholders 
and the general public.2 In January, 1939, the Institute appointed 
a special committee “to examine into auditing procedure and other 
related questions in the light of recent public discussion.” The 
special committee’s report, Extensions of Auditing Procedure, was 
adopted by Council in May, 1939, and, with modifications, by the 
Institute’s members in September of that year. By an amendment 
to the bylaws, the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure was 
established as a standing committee of the Institute.3
2. John L. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, 2 vols. (New York: 
AICPA, 1970), vol. 2.
3. It was not until April, 1966, that, by resolution of the executive committee of 
the Institute, the authority of the committee on auditing procedure to make 
binding pronouncements on auditing without having them approved by the 
members of the Institute was put beyond doubt.
Extensions of Auditing Procedure was issued in October, 1939, 
the first in the series of Statements of Auditing Procedure (SAPs) 
and further pronouncements followed. In February, 1941, the SEC 
adopted a requirement in Accounting Series Release (ASR) no. 21, 
that the independent accountant’s report on financial statements 
filed with the commission state “whether the audit was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable 
in the circumstances.” This prompted the committee on auditing 
procedure to embark on a special study of auditing standards, 
while continuing to issue pronouncements on auditing procedure.
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Because of delays due to World War II, the committee’s report 
on this study was not published until October, 1947, when it issued 
its Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally 
Accepted Significance and Scope. The nine standards set out in 
this report were adopted by the Institute’s membership in Septem­
ber, 1948, and a tenth standard was adopted the following year. 
The year 1948 is also noteworthy because in October the commit­
tee presented in SAP no. 24 a “recommended revised short form of 
accountant’s report or certificate,” which is substantially the same 
as the standard form of report now used.
The committee on auditing procedure distinguished standards 
from procedures by saying that procedures related to acts to be 
performed, whereas standards dealt with “measures of the quality 
of the performance of those acts and the objectives to be obtained 
by the use of the procedures undertaken. Auditing standards, as 
distinct from auditing procedures, concern themselves not only with 
the auditor’s professional qualities but also with the judgment exer­
cised by him in the performance of his examination and in his 
report.”4 These standards have been incorporated into the sev­
eral codifications of committee pronouncements issued in 1951, 
1954, 1963, and 1973. Since 1973, all statements issued by the 
committee have been Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). 
They have always covered both standards and procedures.
4. AICPA, Professional Standards, Looseleaf Service, 4 vols. (New York: Com­
merce Clearing House), vol. 1, AU sec. 150.01.
In 1972, as the Institute prepared for the replacement of the 
AICPA Accounting Principles Board (a senior Institute committee) 
by the independent Financial Accounting Standards Board, it reor­
ganized itself into a number of divisions, each with an executive 
committee. At this time the accounting standards executive com­
mittee came into existence as a new senior Institute committee 
for the purpose, among other things, of providing input to the 
FASB. It was at this time also that the committee on auditing pro­
cedure was reorganized as the auditing standards executive com­
mittee (AudSEC), the name by which it is now known.
Sources of Auditing Standards
Indications of the need for auditing standards have come from a 
number of different directions. Sometimes members of AudSEC 
or its predecessor committee have themselves taken the initiative 
5
to have matters placed on the committee’s agenda. Examples of 
statements that originated in that way are SAP no. 39 (September, 
1967), Working Papers, which was a response to the need for further 
guidance regarding working papers for examinations of financial 
statements or for other engagements to which any of the generally 
accepted auditing standards apply; SAP no. 54 (November, 1972), 
The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control; and SAS 
no. 11 (December, 1975), Using the Work of a Specialist, such as 
an actuary, an appraiser, or a geologist.
Other auditing standards have developed out of the work of 
other AICPA divisions or other organizations within the profession. 
For example, SAP no. 42 (January, 1970), Reporting When a Certi­
fied Public Accountant Is Not Independent, resulted from Opinion 
no. 15, Independence, of the ethics division’s committee on profes­
sional ethics. This SAP dealt with the responsibilities of a CPA 
who is associated with financial statements and who is not inde­
pendent. At the present time, AudSEC is working on a standard 
dealing with auditors’ reports on financial forecasts. Guidelines for 
the preparation of such forecasts have already been issued by the 
Institute’s management advisory services division. Impetus for audit­
ing standards has also come from the accounting principles board 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. For example, SAP 
no. 50 (November, 1971) revised the auditors standard report to 
give recognition to the provisions of APB Opinion no. 19, Reporting 
Changes in Financial Position. SAS no. 10 (December, 1975), In­
terim Financial Information, was issued because of questions raised 
about the need for auditor involvement in connection with the pro­
visions of APB Opinion no. 28.
Finally, from within the profession, state societies of CPAs, 
Institute members, or CPA firms have on several occasions asked 
for guidance. SAP no. 38 (September, 1967), Unaudited Financial 
Statements, SAP no. 49 (November, 1971), Reports on Internal Con­
trol, and SAS no. 5 (July, 1975), which clarifies the meaning of “pre­
sent fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi­
ples,” are all examples of auditing standards that originated in 
this way.
A number of auditing standards have also been formulated in 
response to pressures from outside the profession. The SEC has 
been one source of such pressure. To give just two examples, 
SAS no. 4 (December, 1974), Quality Control Considerations for a 
Firm of Independent Auditors, was a response to criticism from the 
commission on the quality of practice of CPA firms. SAS no. 13 
(May, 1976), Reports on Limited Review of Interim Financial Infor­
mation, was made necessary by ASR no. 177. Several other ex­
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amples of the direct influence of the SEC on auditing standards 
could be cited.
Litigation has also generated auditing standards. The im­
portance of the McKesson & Robbins case in this connection has 
already been mentioned. SAP no. 37 (September, 1966), Special 
Report: Public Warehouses—Controls and Auditing Procedures for 
Goods Held, arose out of the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining 
Corporation case. SAP no. 41 (October, 1969), Subsequent Dis­
covery of Facts Existing at the Date of Auditor’s Report, was a re­
sult of the Yale Express case. Two of the most troublesome stand­
ards, SAS no. 6 (July, 1975), Related Party Transactions and also 
SAS no. 7 (October, 1975), Communications Between Predecessor 
and Successor Auditors, resulted from the U.S. Financial case. Most 
recently, SAS no. 16 (January, 1977), The Independent Auditor’s 
Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities, was issued 
after a special committee, which had looked into the Equity Fund­
ing case, had found a need for a clarification of previous pronounce­
ments on the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud.
Finally, a fairly recent example of an auditing standard which 
was issued in response to concerns expressed in Congress and in 
the press is provided by SAS no. 17 (January, 1977), Illegal Acts by 
Clients. This provides guidance for an auditor when client acts 
that appear to him to be illegal, such as bribes and political contri­
butions, and when other breaches of the law come to his attention.
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The Present Organization— 
Its Strengths and Weaknesses
The auditing standards executive committee has authority for the 
promulgation of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), 
which are binding on members of the AICPA under rule 202 of the 
Institute’s rules of conduct. AudSEC’s pronouncements do not re­
quire clearance from either the Institute’s Council or its board of 
directors, and pronouncements by other AICPA committees that 
have a bearing on auditing and reporting matters must be cleared 
with the chairman of AudSEC. It goes without saying that, behind 
any disciplinary proceedings that might be brought by the Institute 
for failing to follow GAAS, there lie the more serious consequences 
of action by the SEC and the dangers of costly litigation.
AudSEC consists of twenty-one members, all of whom are mem­
bers of the AICPA. At the present time, twenty members are in 
public practice and one is a professor of accounting. All are ap­
pointed annually by the chaiman of the Institute, with the approval 
of the broad of directors. Normally they serve for not more than 
three years, and, by rotation, one-third of the members retire each 
year.
All the members of the committee, including the chairman, 
serve part-time and are expected to devote at least one-third of their 
time to committee work. The work is entirely unpaid, and, although 
a claim for reimbursement of expenses may be made, reimburse­
ment is not requested commonly. Support from members’ firms is 
not limited to the unpaid time spent on the committee’s work and the 
unreimbursed expenses, but often includes the additional time of 
advisers and others.
The preparatory and drafting work on an auditing standard is 
carried out by task forces with the assistance of the staff. Task 
forces usually have a member of AudSEC as chairman and may 
include persons who are not members of the committee. Persons 
who are not members of the Institute may assist in task force 
activities as consultants. At any one time, there may be as many 
as twenty-five task forces at work on projects that are expected to 
result in statements on auditing standards.
Besides the auditing standards executive committee, the audit­
ing standards division has a number of standing committees and 
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subcommittees, and these, like AudSEC itself, are appointed an­
nually by the chairman of the board of the Institute. The division 
has subcommittees on statistical sampling, stockbrokerage, com­
modity futures trading, methods of perpetration and detection of 
fraud, and nonprofit organizations. The work of the division is 
facilitated by standing committees on insurance companies, em­
ployee benefit plans and ERISA, and relations with actuaries. There 
are also special committees to develop audit and accounting guides 
for agribusiness and motor carriers. Other committees administered 
by division staff are developing guidance on reports by manage­
ment, corporate conduct policy statements, and evaluations of in­
ternal accounting control that will ultimately be used by AudSEC.
The staff of the auditing standards division is headed by a 
director and at present includes five managers, one assistant man­
ager, and three clerical staff. The staff provides administrative and 
technical assistance to AudSEC and its subcommittees and task 
forces, and to several other committees that are not part of the 
division.
The initial draft of a statement on auditing standards is usually 
prepared by a task force for consideration by AudSEC and, if ap­
proved for public exposure, is mailed to approximately 25,000 indi­
viduals and groups, including practice offices, state societies, the 
SEC, and the stock exchanges. The exposure period is normally 
sixty to ninety days, after which the comments received are con­
sidered by the task force and a final draft is submitted to AudSEC 
for its approval.
Issuance of a final statement or of an exposure draft requires 
the written affirmative approval of two-thirds of the members of 
AudSEC. If the total of the members who dissent to publication of 
a final statement and the members who qualify their approval with 
respect to the same issue exceeds one-third of the members of 
AudSEC at the time the vote is taken, the document will be deemed 
not to have been approved. Votes are taken on each paragraph 
separately, so that each paragraph must receive at least fourteen 
votes to be approved.
Besides the statements on auditing standards, the division is 
responsible for issuing auditing interpretations and audit guides. 
Interpretations are clarifications of matters on which AudSEC has 
already issued a statement. They are prepared by the staff, and 
before publication, they must be approved by the Institute’s vice- 
president—technical, the chairman of AudSEC, and director of 
the auditing standards division. The first auditing interpretation 
was issued in 1972.
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Audit guides have been issued since 1965 to cover auditing 
and reporting for industries that have unusual characteristics or that 
require special attention. For example, guides have been issued on 
savings and loan associations, colleges and universities, and volun­
tary health and welfare organizations. An audit guide may be ex­
posed or issued only with the approval of the committee or task 
force that prepared it, and it must be cleared by the chairman of 
AudSEC, often after consulting with members of the committee. The 
guide also must be cleared by the chairman of the accounting stand­
ards executive committee (AcSEC) if it includes a description of an 
industry’s accounting practices.
The Strengths of the Present Arrangements
Though the accounting profession, and auditors in particular, have 
come in for a good deal of criticism in recent years, that criticism 
has not been particularly directed at the process of setting auditing 
standards, and such criticism as there has been (which will be noted 
later) has been muted. Even Professor Abraham Briloff, who has 
harshly criticized the performance of auditors, has had little to say 
about the auditing standards themselves or the means by which 
they have been formulated.5
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment of the Committee on Government Operations, The Accounting Establish­
ment, Senate Doc. 95-34, March, 1977, App. K.
6. Maurice Moonitz, Obtaining Agreement on Standards in the Accounting Pro­
fession (Sarasota, Fla.: American Accounting Association, 1974). p. 7.
In his monograph, Obtaining Agreement on Standards in the 
Accounting Profession, Professor Maurice Moonitz’s verdict on the 
profession’s performance in setting auditing standards was much 
more reassuring than he was in relation to accounting standards. 
He says,
The existing set of standards is not perfect, nor is it necessarily 
the best in the world, nor are the standards, such as they are, metic­
ulously observed by all practitioners in all circumstances. The record 
does show that the profession is able to generate the ‘written ex­
pression of what constitutes generally accepted auditing standards.’ 
No one can claim that the set of standards does not exist. Further­
more, when the profession wants to, or has to, it can revise those 
standards and do so quickly. It also has at hand an enforcement 
mechanism that it can use if it chooses to do so. The organization 
is there. It works.6
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And again, later in this monograph he says in the same context, 
“The organizational pattern fits the task to be done. The process 
works.”7
7. Moonitz, Obtaining Agreement on Standards, p. 76.
8. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations (New York: Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978), p. 128.
9. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, pp. 127-28.
Although the Cohen commission’s recommendations call for a 
fairly radical change in the standards-setting process, from the 
present large part-time unpaid committee to a small full-time board, 
its judgment of the present arrangements was not altogether un­
favorable. “The Commission believes that the auditing standards- 
setting process has worked reasonably well. Neither the Commis­
sion’s examination of significant cases against auditors nor any of 
its other research has uncovered significant evidence that audit 
failures are generally traceable to deficiencies in existing auditing 
standards. Existing auditing standards could be improved, and 
many improvements are suggested in this report. However, the 
existing standards-setting structure appears quite capable of provid­
ing the necessary evolution.”8
What are the strengths of the present arrangements? We re­
view them here to help put the need for any changes into perspective.
1. The setting of auditing standards is in the hands of auditors, 
who are best equipped by knowledge and experience to assess 
the costs and benefits of auditing. In the words of the Cohen 
commission, “no need has been established for taking the 
auditing standards-setting function from the domain of the ac­
counting profession. Such a drastic institutional change would 
involve substantial costs. It cannot be justified unless signifi­
cant improvements are needed and can be expected to result 
from the change.”  The burden of proof that significant im­
provements are to be expected must rest on anyone who pro­
poses a different arrangement.
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2. Auditing standards are set within the AICPA, the body whose 
rules of conduct must be one of the principal instruments for 
upholding them. The Institute’s authority is much broader, if 
less potent, than that of the SEC, for the number of businesses 
subject to SEC jurisdiction is only a small proportion of all U.S. 
businesses, incorporated and unincorporated. If responsibility 
for the enforcement of auditing standards rests with the Insti­
tute, it seems appropriate that responsibility for formulating 
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those standards should be there also. However, we recognize 
that members of the Institute may agree to bind themselves to 
enforce extra-legal rules made by some other body, as they do 
in the case of FASB pronouncements through rule 203 of the 
Institute’s rules of conduct.
3. A large volunteer committee, the members of which have the 
support of their firms, can bring to bear on some highly tech­
nical problems the talents and skills of numerous practitioners 
with diverse backgrounds and points of view. This is particu­
larly important when the demands made by numerous subcom­
mittees and task forces are taken into account. However, we 
recognize that as the size of a volunteer body grows, there 
is inevitably a tradeoff between the increasing amount of talent 
it can command and the increasing difficulty of communication 
and control.
4. If standards are to be effective, they must command widespread 
support. They are more likely to do so if they are developed 
within the profession than if they are imposed from outside, or 
even if they are imposed by a group within the profession which 
stands apart from those who must apply the standards.
Criticisms of the Present Arrangements
As the Cohen commission noted, “in contrast to the amount of 
criticism generated by the accounting standards-setting process, 
suggestions for change in setting auditing standards have been 
infrequent.”10 The commission believes that this has resulted, in 
part, from the relative lack of public interest in auditing standards 
as compared with accounting standards. But it went on to what it 
regarded as weaknesses in the process of setting auditing standards.
10. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 132.
11. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations. p. 133.
The commission’s first criticism is that “present guidance on 
the application of auditing standards to audits of different size en­
tities is inadequate. More attention should be accorded to the 
possible effect of variations in audit clients on the nature and extent 
of audit procedures; additional guidance specifically applicable to 
audits of smaller entities should be given.”11
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It is not necessary for us to determine whether this criticism 
of AudSEC is justified. If it is, it is an issue to which AudSEC should 
be responsive, but it hardly calls for radical structural changes. 
Moreover, as the commission noted, the AICPA has already set up 
a new senior technical committee, the accounting and review serv­
ices committee, whose charge is as follows:
To develop on a continuing basis procedures and standards of re­
porting by CPAs on the types of accounting and review services a 
CPA may render in connection with unaudited financial statements 
or other unaudited financial information of an entity that is not re­
quired to file financial statements with a regulatory agency in con­
nection with the sale or trading of its securities in a public market. 
This charge shall not include any of the responsibilities of the Ac­
counting Standards Executive Committee.
Smaller auditing firms are well represented on both committees, 
which gives added assurance that the needs of smaller clients will 
not be ignored.
The commission’s next criticism is that “many pronouncements 
could usefully provide more specific guidance. In particular, when 
a pronouncement deals with the nature and extent of audit pro­
cedures to be applied, there appears to be a tendency to make the 
guidance as general as possible.”12
12. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 133.
The examples given by the commission are from SAS no. 1, 
Part of Examination Made by Other independent Auditors, and SAS 
no. 9, The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of the 
Independent Auditor’s Examination. In connection with SAS no. 1, 
the criticism is that the auditor is given no specific direction on how 
large a portion of the financial statements can be examined by other 
auditors. The complaint against SAS no. 9 is that no guidance is 
given as to when internal auditors may be used to provide direct 
assistance in performing an examination or how much supervision 
they require.
It must be a matter of opinion as to how far an auditing stand­
ard can usefully go in giving specific directions, thereby limiting the 
scope for the auditor’s use of his professional judgment. It has been 
pointed out many times that standards are not text books. Stand­
ards-setting bodies are always perilously poised between the dan­
gers of excessive generality on the one hand and undue specificity 
on the other. Again, we believe that, if the commission’s criticism is 
justified, it is one that does not call for major surgery. We also be­
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lieve that some of the proposals we make in this report will con­
tribute to an improvement in the effectiveness of auditing standards 
in the future.
The commission’s criticism of excessive generality in auditing 
standards is coupled with a suggestion that AudSEC has been re­
luctant to be specific because its members believe that innovations 
in auditing are proprietary matters and that “any competitive ad­
vantage that might be gained by developing methods and ap­
proaches to auditing might be lost if the new knowledge was 
shared.”13 The commission recognizes that “many, if not most, of 
the technological and methodological advances in auditing have in 
fact been developed by auditing firms.”14 This fact powerfully rein­
forces our belief that the authority to set auditing standards should 
remain in the hands of auditors, and preferably of auditors who have 
not been segregated from their practicing colleagues, as would be 
required by the commission’s proposal for a full-time board. The 
commission asserts that AudSEC’s productivity is too low, that some 
standards take too long to get out, and that there is a failure to 
anticipate problems before they become acute.
13. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 134.
14. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 134.
Like the commission, we are concerned to improve the pro­
ductivity of the standards-setting process, regarding both the time­
liness and quality of the output, and the proposals that we make 
later in this report to reduce the size of AudSEC and to expand and 
strengthen its staff are designed to that end. Unfortunately, speed 
sometimes can be achieved only at the expense of quality, and 
without the protracted consideration that some difficult matters on 
AudSEC’s agenda have received, broadly acceptable standards 
could not have been developed. There is, however, no doubt that 
the formulation of some auditing standards has taken too long.
The case usually cited is SAS no. 6, Related Party Transactions. 
Consideration of this standard was begun in February, 1969, fol­
lowing the Continental Vending case, and was not concluded until 
July, 1975, when the U.S. Financial case made standard setting a 
matter of urgency. The questions that gave the committee most 
trouble were primarily accounting issues rather than issues of an 
auditing nature. There were not, nor are there now, any accounting 
standards for the measurement and disclosure of transactions not 
entered into at arm’s length. Some of the troublesome questions 
are these:
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• When is a transaction between related parties equivalent to a 
similar transaction entered into at arm’s length?
• Would the transaction have been entered into at all if the 
parties had been at arm’s length?
• How much reliance can be placed on management representa­
tions in such circumstances?
• How much and what kinds of disclosure should be required 
concerning related party transactions?
• Does a related party transaction have a lower “materiality 
threshold” than is normally applied?
• What special audit procedures are necessary to identify and 
probe related party transactions?
These are only some of the complexities that arose in the commit­
tee’s consideration of this exceedingly difficult matter and held up 
the issuance of a standard.
That AudSEC has failed to anticipate problems or to quickly 
recognize emerging problems is an easy charge to bring and a 
difficult one to rebut. However, the proposal we shall outline for 
an advisory council to work with AudSEC should provide a remedy 
for any lack of foresight that the committee may have shown in the 
past.
The final criticism voiced by the Cohen Commission concerns 
the quality of the members of AudSEC and of its staff. The com­
mission was critical particularly of the limitation of a member’s 
term to three years, under the AICPA’s policy. This, the commis­
sion says, slows the momentum of some projects. Our later pro­
posals are responsive, we believe, to the commission’s point. Its 
other point that, AudSEC’s members being part-time volunteers, 
they have “significant client responsibilities, so that the amount of 
time they can devote is less than is desirable” must be weighed 
against the advantages of having auditing standards set by prac­
ticing auditors.15 Our proposals also bear on this criticism by the 
commission and go far to lessen its force.
15. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 135.
John C. Burton, a former chief accountant of the SEC and 
now a professor at Columbia University, is among AudSEC’s sever­
est critics. Writing in the Journal of Accountancy to advocate what 
he calls a “legislatively-sanctioned self-regulating body,” he says—
In general, the standard-setting mechanism has not resulted in an 
innovative approach to the auditing function but has tended to en­
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shrine or justify current practices. Recent auditing standards have 
emphasized protection against litigation, and their consideration by 
AudSEC has been heavily influenced by participation of legal counsel 
for the major firms. AudSEC has been hesitant to increase auditors’ 
responsibilities except under pressure from outside forces.16
16. John C. Burton, “The Profession’s Institutional Structure in the 1980s,” 
Journal of Accountancy, April, 1978, p. 66.
17. A. A. Sommer, Jr., “The Lion and the Lamb: Can the Profession Live with 
‘Cooperative Regulation’?” Journal of Accountancy, April, 1978, p. 73.
This again is an area where judgments may legitimately differ. 
It is questionable whether it is within the province of a standards- 
setting body to seek to increase auditors’ responsibilities, at least 
until it has been demonstrated that there is a need to expand them 
and that the benefits to society are likely to exceed the costs. One 
can well imagine that aggressive action by the profession to expand 
the scope of its work and its responsibilities, with a concomitant in­
crease in its fees, would be met by a charge of self-aggrandizement. 
In one area where increased responsibilities might have been as­
sumed by the profession—financial forecasts—the SEC was itself, 
until recently a restraining influence. This matter, incidentally, has 
been occupying AudSEC’s attention for some time and a new 
auditing standard dealing with forecasts is currently under discus­
sion.
We share Dr. Burton’s concern that the profession should be 
responsive to its social obligations, in the matter of auditing stand­
ards as in other aspects, though we do not agree with him that an 
extension of public regulation is the way to go in the 1980s. Rather, 
we agree with Mr. Sommer, a former commissioner of the SEC, 
when he says of Dr. Burton’s proposal that—
it runs directly against the increasingly predominant current of Amer­
ican opinion, which looks to a reduction in the level of existing regu­
lation, abstention from the adoption of more regulation unless the 
reason is extremely compelling, and a greater reliance on the subtler 
forces in our society to bring about evolutionary reform.17
In accordance with this spirit, we prefer to endeavor to achieve 
the same ends as Dr. Burton but within the framework of the 
AICPA. We think our own more modest proposals are superior 
to any more drastic system of regulation by a government or a 
quasi-government agency.
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The Cohen Commission’s Proposal 
and an Alternative
The Cohen commission’s principal proposal for improvement of the 
standards-setting process in the auditing field is to replace AudSEC 
by a smaller full-time auditing standards board within the AICPA 
and compensated by the Institute on a scale comparable with the 
present earnings of its members. The members would be appointed, 
as AudSEC now is, by the chairman of the board of the AICPA 
with the approval of the board of directors.
This proposal does not appear to follow from the commission’s 
analysis of the standards-setting process which, as we have already 
noted, the commission “believes ... has worked reasonably well.” 
There would, of course, be an attractive symmetry between a full- 
time auditing standards board and the full-time Financial Account­
ing Standards Board. Yet the two fields are less alike than might 
appear at first sight, and the arguments which led to the creation 
of the FASB do not apply with anything like the same force in the 
sphere of auditing.
The principal argument for establishing the FASB as a full-time 
body outside the AICPA rested on the need for accounting standards 
to be in the hands of a body whose members would be, and would 
be seen to be, independent of the interests of their clients. The 
need for those who set standards to be independent is not nearly 
so great in the case of auditing as in accounting, for private interests 
outside the profession are much less sensitive to changes in audit­
ing standards than they are to pronouncements of the FASB.
If there is an “independence” argument at all in favor of a 
full-time board, it is that members of a volunteer board may be 
unduly reluctant to vote for a standard that would necessitate a 
change in their firms’ present practices, with all the dislocation 
and expense that may ensue. The cost to society of a change re­
sulting from a new standard is indeed one of the considerations 
which should be taken into account when the proposal for it is 
being debated. We have seen no evidence that desirable changes 
in auditing standards have been blocked by such considerations, 
though there may have been some delays. The change in the vot­
ing rule that we recommend below will help to expedite the stand­
ards-setting process, and the proposed advisory council should 
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act as a safeguard against any undue self-protectiveness that 
AudSEC members might be tempted to show.
A second reason for setting up the FASB as a full-time free­
standing body outside the AICPA was the opportunity which it gave 
to obtain skills and viewpoints not to be found among members of 
the Institute. However, there is much less scope for outsiders to 
contribute to discussions of auditing than to discussions of account­
ing, and there is little interest in the subject outside the ranks of 
the profession. Our proposals make suitable provision for the con­
tributions of persons outside the profession by opening AudSEC 
to nonmembers of the Institute and by the establishment of an ad­
visory council whose members may be drawn from a variety of fields.
The foregoing considerations greatly weaken the arguments 
for a full-time body, and we think that the commission underesti­
mates the strength of the arguments against such a move. Two 
considerations weigh heavily with us. First, a gulf may develop be­
tween the profession and a full-time board. A situation in which 
“they” set the standards and “we” observe and enforce them is 
best avoided. Second, a full-time board may have difficulty recruit­
ing persons of the right caliber to serve on it. Even if a “revolving 
door” policy were accepted, whereby members of the board could 
return to their former firms after serving on it for several years, our 
inquiries leave considerable doubt about the availability of the most 
able practitioners for service on the board.
A compromise arrangement between a wholly full-time paid 
board and a wholly part-time board—a compromise that commands 
a good deal of support—is to have a part-time board with a full- 
time highly paid chairman. Two members of the committee, Messrs. 
Bull and Oliphant, favor this arrangement. Three members of the 
committee, Messrs. Defliese, Derieux, and Kessler, favor a part-time 
board with a part-time chairman and a highly paid executive di­
rector. The arguments in support of these two positions are set out 
below.
The minority view is based on the following arguments:
1. A full-time chairman will be able to give the board his undivided 
attention. He will be available at all times to discuss the board’s 
business and will be able to provide day-to-day supervision 
of the staff. He will not be distracted by the need to be avail­
able to his partners for consultation or otherwise in the conduct 
of his firm’s affairs. He will thus be in the best position to pro­
vide effective leadership to the board and its staff.
2. He will have maximum visibility as the recognized leader of 
the profession and the board’s spokesman in matters directly 
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relating to auditing standards. At a time when Congress and 
the SEC are taking a lively interest in the profession, this fact 
has considerable appeal.
3. A full-time chairman will be in a better position to take a long- 
range view of the board’s business, to plan ahead, and to give 
thought to emerging problems before they become urgent.
4. The position of full-time chairman, with the visibility and salary 
that would go with it, should prove attractive to well-qualified 
candidates, including some associated with smaller firms. Out­
standing candidates are more likely to be attracted to this posi­
tion than to a position as executive director.
5. A full-time chairman would be able to serve a longer term than 
could be expected of a volunteer chairman. This would provide 
for greater continuity and would be likely to attract a better 
staff with less staff turnover.
6. A change to a full-time chairman, following the example of the 
Institute’s full-time president, more effectively signals the pro­
fession’s readiness to respond to the needs of the times.
The arguments advanced by the majority in support of a volun­
teer, part-time chairman are as follows:
1. Though nominally part-time, a volunteer chairman would in fact 
devote almost all of his time to work of the board. He would 
have the support of a highly paid executive director, and such 
a team could provide better leadership than could a full-time 
chairman. The post of executive director would attract better 
candidates if the chairman were part-time.
2. A full-time chairman would not be able to move faster than 
the rest of the board, so that there would be no gain in expedi­
tion from such an arrangement.
3. A full-time chairman would have to interrupt his career path. 
It would, therefore, probably be difficult to attract a field of out­
standing candidates. It would also be more difficult to replace 
an unsuccessful full-time chairman.
4. Practitioners would identify less easily with a full-time chair­
man than with a volunteer. A volunteer would command more 
support from his fellow practitioners, for they would see him as 
presenting less of a threat of becoming an auditing “czar.”
5. There is more likely to be a harmonious relationship within the 
board if all its members, including the chairman, are volunteers.
6. There would be a minor problem of fitting a full-time chairman 
into the Institute’s organizational structure.
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7. If the auditing standards board were now to be established 
with a volunteer chairman, it would be easier to move to a full- 
time chairman subsequently, if this were seen to be necessary. 
The appointment of a full-time chairman now would not be 
easily reversible; and as the selection would require great care, 
the creation of the new board might be seriously delayed.
The recommendations in this report are based on the assump­
tion that the majority view will prevail. If it does not—if the chairman 
of the auditing standards board is to be a full-time officer of the 
Institute—some of the recommendations which follow, such as those 
relating to the term of office of the chairman and the position of the 
executive director, would need to be modified. However, we wish to 
emphasize that all of the other proposals in this report command our 
unanimous support. Once the position of the chairman and related 
issues have been resolved we urge that our recommendations be 
effected with the utmost dispatch. This is not a time for further reflec­
tion and delay.
20
Recommendations
We propose that AudSEC be reconstituted within the AICPA as the 
AICPA Auditing Standards Board, with the following charge:
The AICPA Auditing Standards Board shall be responsible for 
the promulgation of auditing standards and procedures to be 
observed by members of the AICPA in accordance with the 
Institute’s rules of conduct.
The board shall be alert to new opportunities for auditors 
to serve the public, both by the assumption of new responsi­
bilities and by improved ways of meeting old ones, and shall 
as expeditiously as possible develop standards and pro­
cedures that will enable the auditor to assume those responsi­
bilities.
Auditing standards and procedures promulgated by the 
board shall—
a. Define the nature and extent of the auditor’s responsi­
bilities.
b. Provide guidance to the auditor in carrying out his duties, 
enabling him to express an opinion on the reliability of 
the representations on which he is reporting.
c. Make special provision, where appropriate, to meet the 
needs of small enterprises.
d. Have regard to the costs which they impose on society in 
relation to the benefits reasonably expected to be de­
rived from the audit function.
The auditing standards board shall provide auditors with 
all possible guidance in the implementation of its pronounce­
ments, by means of interpretations of its statements, by the 
issuance of guidelines, and by any other means available to it.
Composition and Appointment of the Board
We agree with the widely held view that AudSEC is at present too 
large to be fully effective. We recommend that the new board have 
fifteen members, a number still large enough to provide a variety of 
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points of view. Any person who has had extensive experience in 
auditing, whether a member of the Institute or not, should be eligible 
to serve. Experience in auditing might include internal auditing and 
governmental auditing. Board members need not be currently en­
gaged in auditing. Thus persons in academe or industry with suit­
able previous experience would be eligible. However, we think 
that at least two-thirds of the board members should be Institute 
members currently in public practice. They should be drawn from 
all sizes and kinds of firms. We do not think it desirable to stipulate 
quotas to secure representation of any particular segment of the 
practicing profession.
The inclusion on the board of persons who are not members of 
the Institute will necessitate a change in the bylaws. This change 
can be effected on the first occasion when other changes have to 
be made.
The appointment of the chairman and members of the auditing 
standards board should be by the chairman of the Institute with the 
consent of its board of directors. Recommendations should be 
sought from various interested groups such as state societies and 
from firms within the profession. They should also be requested 
from the advisory council, the creation of which we recommend 
below.
The chairman and members of the board should be appointed 
for renewable one-year terms. Normally they should expect to 
serve for three years, with the possibility of reappointment for a 
longer period that would not extend their service beyond a total of 
six years. A shorter period than three years is too short to yield the 
full benefit from the learning period; a period longer than six years 
would allow too little turnover. Reappointments each year make it 
easy to replace ineffectual members without undue delay.
It is advantageous to choose a chairman who has previously 
served as a board member, though previous board membership 
should not be a requirement.
Votes and Meetings
At present, approval of an auditing standard requires a two-thirds 
majority of AudSEC, or fourteen affirmative votes in a committee of 
twenty-one members. There is some support for a change to a 
simple majority rule. The FASB has recently made such a change. 
If our recommendation for a board of fifteen persons is adopted, 
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we believe that nine affirmative votes should be required to approve 
a statement. This is one more than a simple majority but is less 
restrictive of change than a two-thirds majority rule is apt to be.
In accordance with Institute policy, those portions of the 
board’s meetings relating to (a) the establishment of standards 
through statements on auditing standards, and (b) other auditing 
and reporting matters directly affecting the public interest will 
be open to the public. Meetings and portions of meetings relating to 
other matters may be held in private. On particular issues, it may 
be desirable for the board to hold public hearings.
Despite the Wheat committee’s contrary recommendation, the 
FASB now publishes dissenting opinions when a standard is issued, 
and we see no reason why the auditing standards board should not 
do likewise. Dissents often clarify the majority opinion that is being 
dissented from. They also force the dissenters to think through and 
articulate the minority view. We are content to leave this matter in 
the hands of the board.
Compensation of the Board
At the present time, the Institute pays no compensation to AudSEC 
members. Reimbursement is made for expenses incurred if a mem­
ber requests it. This arrangement puts a relatively heavy burden on 
members from small firms and may discourage some from accepting 
appointment to the committee. This is perhaps the strongest argu­
ment against an all-volunteer board.
We propose that, in return for a commitment of at least fifty 
percent of his time to the work of the board, a member (including 
the chairman) may request compensation. Such payment should 
be determined by the board of directors to offset in part any loss of 
income which results from the commitment of the member’s time. 
In addition, members should routinely be reimbursed for expenses.
We recognize that the foregoing proposal will create a prece­
dent in relation to the work of other Institute committees. However, 
the heavy commitment of time involved in the setting of inforceable 
standards gives rise to special problems. Members of small firms 
have made heavy sacrifices to serve the Institute in the past. We 
want to ensure that the best talent will continue to be available, 
wherever it can be found.
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An Expanded and Strengthened Staff
At present, AudSEC’s staff consists of a director and six other pro­
fessional staff members. In our view, the staff has performed well 
considering the work load it has been expected to carry. Much of 
the responsibility for research which precedes the issuance of an 
auditing statement falls on the firms to which AudSEC’s members 
belong. We propose that the staff be considerably expanded and 
strengthened, to enable it to undertake more research, to provide 
more support for the task forces that will perform much of the pre­
paratory work on new standards, and to take over more of the work 
of drafting. As the Cohen commission noted, the staff assigned by 
the Institute to auditing standards has increased to its present size 
from only one or two persons in 1970.
At the head of the staff there should be a highly qualified, well- 
paid executive director. At hearings before governmental bodies 
and on other public occasions where auditing standards are under 
discussion, the board would normally be represented by the chair­
man and director appearing together. Except in administrative mat­
ters, the director will report to the chairman and members of the 
auditing standards board, and he will work in close and constant 
contact with the chairman to maintain the pace of the board’s work. 
The two will also have to collaborate closely in drawing up the 
board’s agenda and in overseeing the task forces.
In calling for a strengthening of the staff, we are particularly 
concerned to insure that the board should have all the research 
capability it needs. One member of the staff should be designated 
to direct the necessary research and should be appointed primarily 
for his research skills. He should report directly to the executive 
director, under whom he will have responsibility for directing the 
board’s research activities.
If the chairman and executive director, in consultation with the 
research director, think that research needs to be done that is be­
yond the capacity of the staff, either because of the pressure of 
other work or because special skills are required, it will be within 
their province to select an outside consultant to do the work for a 
fee. Consultants will sometimes be academics, sometimes partners 
or staff members of practicing firms, and occasionally, perhaps, will 
be drawn from neither of these categories. The board’s budget 
will, of course, have to provide for such needs.
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Task Forces
Task forces will be set up by the board as necessary to do the pre­
paratory work on a new statement. Membership of a task force will 
not necessarily be confined to Institute members. A task force may 
include one or more board members, but this is not necessary. 
Members of task forces will not be paid but may claim reimburse­
ment of expenses. The report of a task force will be in the nature 
of a recommendation to the board which the board may accept, 
reject, or amend as it sees fit. Since the task forces will not be mak­
ing final decisions, their meetings need not be open to the public.
An Auditing Standards Advisory Council
There is widespread support for the idea that the auditing standards 
board should have an advisory council to work with it, and we be­
lieve that such a council could contribute materially to the board’s 
effectiveness. The council’s principal functions would be—
1. To bring to the board’s attention problems calling for new 
standards or revisions or interpretations of previous pronounce­
ments.
2. To review the board’s agenda and to offer guidance on the 
priorities implicit in the agenda.
3. To review proposed pronouncements of the board in an ad­
visory capacity, both before and after they have been exposed 
for public comment.
4. To recommend persons to serve on the standards board and 
on its task forces.
5. To report at least annually on the work of the board and the 
extent to which it has fulfilled its charge. This report will be 
made to the board of directors of the Institute and will be made 
public.
The advisory council should have between twelve and eighteen 
members. As the Wheat committee said of the Financial Account­
ing Standards Advisory Council, “the only qualification for member­
ship on the advisory council should be a capacity to make a con­
tribution to the work of the Standards Board.” Its members might 
include, for example, preparers and users of financial statements, 
academics, financial analysts, government officials, lawyers, bank­
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ers, underwriters, and CPAs (whether engaged in public practice 
or otherwise).
The members of the advisory council will be appointed by the 
chairman of the Institute, who will also name the chairman of the 
council. No member of the council (including its chairman) will 
be a member of the standards board. Members will be appointed for 
one-year terms but may be reappointed. They should not normally 
serve for more than three years in total. They will serve without pay 
but will be entitled to claim reimbursement for expenses.
We recommend that the council meet at least once a quarter, 
in public. It should have a small staff of perhaps one or two persons, 
separate from the staff of the board, to assist it in carrying out its 
duties, including preparation of an annual report on the board’s 
activities.
A Fellowship Program
The work of the board could be further strengthened by the creation 
of a small number of fellowships, tenable normally for from eighteen 
months to two years. Fellows might be academics with auditing 
experience or practitioners who, while serving the board, would be 
enhancing their own education. Their stipends would be provided 
for in the board’s budget.
Conclusion
When a profession is under fire, it is tempting to propose dramatic 
reforms, which may have cosmetic advantages if no others. We 
have resisted that temptation. We believe that the proposals made 
in this report are responsive to the needs of the situation. They will 
enable the task of setting auditing standards to proceed more 
effectively and with a minimum of disruption.
We conclude this report with a quotation, not from an account­
ant but from a lawyer who is more than usually well-informed about 
the accounting profession:
The involvement of the accounting profession in the establishment of 
professional standards has been of substantial public benefit not only 
by virtue of the standards thus developed and improved, but also by 
serving as a focal point for the organization, recognition and develop­
ment of the accounting profession itself. To a substantial extent, 
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the rise of the accounting profession has been grounded on that 
involvement. A profession actively involved in the development of 
its standards will do a better job in their application. By their efforts, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the inde­
pendent Financial Accounting Standards Board, have provided a rea­
sonably coherent framework for accounting and auditing practice in 
areas that otherwise would have been subjected to fragmented or 
conflicting regulation.... The process works more than reasonably 
well.18
18. James F. Strother, “The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review, vol. 28, no. 1, January, 1975, pp. 232-233.
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Appendix
Adoption of the Recommendations of the 
Special Committee to Study 
the Structure of AudSEC
By a resolution of the Council of the AICPA, the recommendations of the 
special committee to study the structure of AudSEC were adopted on May 
10, 1978, with the following modifications:
1. The AICPA Auditing Standards Board should be composed solely of 
members of the AICPA, including members not engaged in public 
practice.
2. The chief staff officer should be designated as a vice president­
auditing.
3. Reimbursement of expenses of AICPA Auditing Standards Board 
members should be available under the present regular Council policy.
4. It is expected that those accepting appointment to the AICPA Audit­
ing Standards Board will devote a substantial portion of their time to 
the board’s activities. Therefore, upon request, members of the board 
shall be compensated on a confidential basis. A standard amount of 
such compensation shall be established by the AICPA Board of 
Directors.
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